MERGER CONTROL: A CASE OF FORM OVER SUBSTANCE BY DANIELA MARIOTTI
Striking the right balance between regulation and the creation of a merger- friendly environment can be and, indeed, frequently is tricky.
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01 September 2008
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MERGER ANALYSIS SHOULD INCLUDE NON-CONTROLLING INTERESTS... OR SHOULD IT? BY OMESHNEE PILLAY
The intermediate merger between Primedia, Capricorn Capital Partners and New Africa Investments, recently considered by the Competition Appeal Court, has far-reaching implications in the application of our merger control legislation.
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26 June 2008
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MERGER ANALYSIS SHOULD INCLUDE NON-CONTROLLING INTERESTS ... OR SHOULD IT? - OMESHNEE PILLAY
The intermediate merger between Primedia, Capricorn Capital Partners and New Africa Investments, recently considered by the Competition Appeal Court, has far-reaching implications in the application of our merger control legislation.
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20 June 2008
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COMBATING CARTELS: WHAT ARE THE REAL BENEFITS TO THE END CONSUMER? – PAULA YOUENS
The surge of activity in combating cartels in the airline, motor vehicle, milk, bread, milling and most recently the pharmaceutical industry suggests that the desired goals of the Competition Act particularly through the introduction of the Corporate Leniency Policy or CLP, are being met – but is this really a win for the end consumer?
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19 February 2008
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NATIONWIDE SETTLES DAMAGES CLAIM FOR SAA’S ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - TAMARA DINI
The case for Nationwide’s claim for civil damages, suffered as a result of SAA’s abuse of dominance, was settled out of court last week.
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19 February 2008
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COMPETITION – CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY REVIEW
An effective leniency program will lead cartels members to confess their conduct even before an investigation is opened.
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15 October 2007
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JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN COMPETITORS AND PRICING AGREEMENTS
One of the primary concerns of competition law is conduct where two or more competing firms collude for the purpose of reducing rivalry between them so that the colluding firms can exercise market power. In this regard, s 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act (“the Act”) has a blanket prohibition on the horizontal restrictive practices of price fixing, division of markets and collusive tendering.
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20 September 2007
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COMPETITION LAW SIBERGRAMME NO 3 OF 2007
REVISITING THE RULES - THE EXTENT TO WHICH MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS CAN DETERMINE THE PRICES CHARGED BY THEIR DISTRIBUTORS
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13 September 2007
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DAWN RAIDS
South African competition law is governed by the Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998 (the Act).
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12 September 2007
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WHAT CONSTITUTES IMPLEMENTATION FOR PURPOSES OF MERGER CONTROL?
Our Competition Act provides that the parties to an intermediate merger may not implement that merger until it has been approved, with or without conditions, by the relevant competition authority. The parties to most mergers are anxious to implement as soon as possible, particularly in international mergers where the South African element of the merger may be inconsequential in the scheme of the transaction.
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23 March 2007
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